We carry out a large monetary stakes insurance experiment with very small probabilities of losses and ambiguous as well as exact probabilities. Many individuals do not want to pay anything for insurance whether the probabilities are given exactly or are ambiguous. Many others, however, are willing to pay surprisingly large amounts. With ambiguity, the percentage of those paying nothing is smaller and the willingness to pay (WTP) of the other individuals larger than with exact probabilities. Comparing elasticities with ambiguity, we find that worry is much more important than subjective probability in determining WTP for insurance. Furthermore, when the ambiguous loss probability is increased by a factor of 1000, it has almost no effect on WTP.
INTRODUCTION
There is empirical evidence that many individuals exhibit behavior that implies they are either unconcerned or extremely risk averse when deciding whether to purchase insurance against events that have a small probability of occurring (Kunreuther, 1978; McClelland, Schulze, & Coursey, 1993; Slovic, Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, Corrigan, & Combs, 1978) . The unconcerned individuals are not willing to pay a penny even if premiums are subsidized, whereas those who appear to be highly risk averse opt for premiums that are more than 10 times the expected losses. There is additional evidence from controlled experiments that people have a difficult time comprehending the meaning of small probabilities (Kunreuther, Novemsky, & Kahneman, 2001) .
Self-reports of worry have been shown to be related to individuals' tendencies to protect themselves against potential losses (Baron, Hershey, & Kunreuther, 2000) . These findings are consistent with many other studies on the role that affect and emotions play in decision making with respect to protective measures (Hogarth & Kunreuther, 1995; Hsee & Kunreuther, 2000; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002) . However, the impact of cognitive and emotional drivers of willingness to pay (WTP) for insurance with very small probabilities of disaster has not been documented in these studies.
This study provides answers to the following three questions:
(1) Are there any differences with respect to the WTP for insurance when the probabilities are ambiguous (Ellsberg, 1961) or exact in case the probability of a disaster is very small?
(2) What is the relative importance of worry (as an emotion) and subjective probability (as a cognitive aspect) for WTP for insurance when the probability of a disaster is very small? (3) How sensitive are individuals' WTP to large increases in the ambiguous probability of disaster?
We designed an experiment where two randomly selected individuals could each lose US$1100 should one of two hazards occur and they do not have insurance. However, although those payoffs were in real money, our experiment was designed in a way that no participant could have left with a negative net balance (i.e., paying something to the experimenter); hence, we did not run into any ethical or legal issues (for more details, see the Method section).
Consistent with the results of McClelland et al. (1993) , our findings show that a substantial percentage of individuals are not willing to pay anything for insurance when the probabilities of losses are either exact or ambiguous whereas others tend to be willing to pay surprisingly large amounts. In line with other research (e.g., Curley, Yates, & Abrams, 1986; Hogarth & Kunreuther, 1985) , WTP is higher when probabilities are ambiguous than when they are known. Strikingly, worry appears to be a major driver of WTP for insurance, whereas subjective probability judgments have hardly any impact.
METHOD
Nature of the experiment Participants were told that they had inherited a painting (part A of the experiment) or a sculpture (part B) and received small photos of the respective art object with individual identification numbers. At the start of the experiment, everyone learned that only one painting and one sculpture were originals worth 2000 DM that could be converted into an equivalent cash amount. If the piece of art was a forgery, then it had zero value. The two individuals with the original painting and sculpture were determined by random draws at the end of the experiment. This is an application of the random pay mechanism suggested and investigated by Bolle (1990) .
Sample
A total of 263 students from Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt/ M., participated in the experiment. They were recruited via email, posters, and short presentations in classrooms and were told that the experiment would take 90 min; all participants would receive 10DM for sure, and there was a small chance (not specified) that they would end up with 2000 DM in real cash at the end of the experiment (approximately US$1100 at the time of the experiment). The study was carried out in groups of 6 to 10 students, each of whom was situated in a separate booth. Of the 263 respondents, nine were eliminated from the study either because they bid more for insurance than the value of the art object (2000 DM) or because they mistakenly thought they were bidding for the art object and not for insurance. (They indicated this in their response to an open-ended question at the end of the experiment on how they determined WTP.) Hence, the sample size was reduced to 254 respondents.
Experimental conditions
The experimental design is depicted in Table 1 . Group 1 individuals were asked to state their maximum WTP for insurance against each of two hazards (fire and theft) with respect to a painting (part A) and a sculpture (part B). Group 2 differed only in that respondents in parts A and B were asked to state their maximum WTP for one insurance policy covering the two hazards. Group 3 (part A) looked at stepwise purchase of insurance that is unrelated to the aspects of interest in this paper and will not be analyzed here. Group 3 (part B) presented subjects with a much higher ambiguous probability than the ones given to groups 1 and 2 (part B).
Nature of the risks and timing
In all conditions and in both parts of the experiment, the original painting or sculpture was threatened by fire and theft, and the participants were offered insurance protection against a potential loss of 2000 DM. They were told that the insurer would sell a policy only to the owner of the original art object; insurance purchased by others would be treated as hypothetical and not affect their final wealth level. In other words, only the owner of the original painting or sculpture would have to pay for coverage. We indicated that it was in everyone's best interest to anticipate being the owner of the respective original art object when determining the maximum amount they would be willing to pay for an insurance policy. In addition to providing written instructions, we presented a flow diagram to subjects, describing the key variables and the decisions they had to make. All questions were answered, and the procedure was explained again when necessary. The instructions are reported in Appendix A.
In part A of the experiment, each participant inherited a painting. Groups 1 and 2 were told that the original was threatened by the following ambiguous risk: the painting was declared to be stolen if it rained exactly 24 days in July in the current year at the Frankfurt airport similarly, a fire occurred and destroyed the painting if it rained exactly 23 days at the Frankfurt airport in August. Subjects were informed that a rain day occurs if the weather station at the Frankfurt airport reports that there was more than 1 mm of precipitation during the relevant 24-hour period. No probability estimates for these events were provided. However, it was made clear that the occurrence of those events would actually determine a loss of 2000 DM for the one individual who owned the real painting if she were uninsured. As the experiment was carried out in April and May, the participants knew that they would only learn if the painting was impacted by a fire or theft several months after they made their decision on whether or not to purchase insurance.
We define ambiguity as a state of mind in which the decision maker perceives difficulties in estimating the relevant probabilities (Camerer & Weber, 1992) . Whereas rain frequencies may be precisely estimated by meteorologists, they will be ambiguous for most if not all the participants in the experiment. This situation was designed to resemble a reallife risk (e.g., a fire or theft in one's home) where insurers estimate annual loss probabilities across all policyholders, but the individual homeowner views these risks as ambiguous. The of actual Frankfurt weather data from the year 1870 to the time of the experiment turned out to be consistent with Rain frequencies in July and August each with probability of one in 10 000-separate insurance policies for theft and fire
Two precise risks, each with probability of one in 10 000-separate insurance policies for theft and fire Group 2 (n = 81) Rain frequencies in July and August each with probability of one in 10 000-one insurance policy for theft and fire Two precise risks, each with probability of one in 10 000-one insurance policy for theft and fire Group 3 (n = 86) Rain frequencies in July and August each with probability of one in 10 000-first insurance sold before second risk introduced Rain frequencies in July and August, each with probability of one in 10-separate insurance policies for theft and fire Note: An inherited object was threatened by theft and fire in all treatments. Subjects were offered insurance against these risks, and the willingness to pay for the insurance was elicited. Part A of group 3 faced the same small ambiguous high probabilities as part A of groups 1 and 2 but the first insurance for fire was sold before the second risk for theft was introduced. Therefore, part A of group 3 is not strictly comparable with the other treatments and excluded from further analysis.
a Poisson distribution. On the basis of this distribution, we then estimated the probability of each of the above events occurring to be approximately one in 10 000.
In part B of the experiment, the participants in groups 1 and 2 were told that a sculpture was threatened by theft and fire, each of which was specified as having a probability of one in 10 000 of occurring. A sculpture instead of a painting was chosen, so respondents viewed this treatment as a new experimental situation. For us to determine whether a fire had occurred, two random draws with replacement were taken from a bingo cage containing 100 balls numbered 1 to 100. A fire would destroy the sculpture only if the number 1 was pulled in both of the random draws. The same procedure was followed to determine whether a theft occurred.
In group 3 in part B of the experiment, respondents had a one in 10 ambiguous chance of either fire or theft. More specifically, a theft occurred if it rained 12 days in July, and a fire occurred if it rained 11 days in August at the Frankfurt airport. We used this relatively high likelihood to see the impact of a significant increase in the ambiguous probability of a loss on WTP for insurance compared with the premiums that individuals in groups 1 and 2 were willing to pay for protection.
Note that in groups 1 and 2, the ambiguous low-probability situation is always presented first. If we had initially presented the exact probabilities scenario to some of the respondents, they might have anchored on this figure when estimating the likelihood of rain in Frankfurt, potentially distorting our results on ambiguity.
Eliciting willingness to pay for insurance Rather than specifying premiums for the insurance policies, we utilized a modified Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (BDM) (1964) mechanism for eliciting maximum WTP values.
In the original BDM mechanism, individuals face a random draw of a market price from a pre-specified interval, for example, containing balls numbered from 0 to 100, corresponding to prices from US$0 to US$100. Because an insurance decision involves loss probabilities, individuals would have faced two probability distributions: a loss due to theft or fire and the chance of a specific price being drawn for determining the market price of insurance. Although the maximum WTP specified by a rational decision maker would not have been affected by the complexity of this setup, Safra, Segal, and Spivak (1990) indicated that decision makers being asked for their WTP for a risky good using the standard BDM mechanism are likely to reduce the resulting two-stage to a one-stage lottery (processing only one joint probability distribution with the respective outcomes) and may make errors in doing so. Pre-specified intervals of WTP in the original BDM procedure may also serve as anchors, thus biasing individuals' estimates (Bohm, Lindén, & Sonnegard, 1997) .
In the modified BDM procedure we used, the actual selling prices for each of the insurance policies were inserted in sealed envelopes to be opened only after the experiment was conducted, thus precluding such a bias. This undisclosed price was selected before the start of the experiment on the basis of pre-test results with respect to WTP, so that about one-half of the respondents' bids could be expected to be higher than the pre-determined price. There was no specific reason for choosing this price with respect to the experimental procedure; it gave respondents a reasonable chance of purchasing insurance. The modified BDM mechanism was first introduced in a laboratory research by Schade and Kunreuther (2001) and has recently been used in the marketing literature to reveal reservation prices at the point of purchase (Wang, Venkatesh, & Chatterjee, 2007) .
The mechanism was carefully explained to the subjects so that they understood that it was in their best interest to specify a maximum WTP for insurance. We noted that if they bid too high, they might actually pay that price for insurance should they be the owner of the original art object and regret having made such a high offer. If they bid too low, they might not qualify for insurance even though they would have been willing to purchase coverage at a higher price than their stated value. Respondents were then asked to write their maximum WTP for insurance on a piece of paper and place it in an envelope.
Eliciting subjective probability estimates After stating maximum buying prices for insurance, the respondents were asked to estimate the probability of each of the ambiguous risks. We distributed tables with likelihoods of a loss ranging from certainty to one in 10 000 000. The event (the number of rain days in Frankfurt in July or August) whose likelihood the respondents were to judge was stated at the top of each probability table (Appendix B). Respondents were first asked to mark the probability of a fire or theft causing a loss in one of 15 intervals specified in Appendix B. Respondents could also indicate that the risk was less than one in 10 000 000. After they checked one of the intervals, they were then asked for their best point estimate of a probability of a loss.
Eliciting the level of worry
After completing parts A and B of the experiment, subjects were asked the following question:
How worried were you that if you were the owner of the original painting (sculpture), that you would lose the money? (This is a translation of the following question in German: "Wie besorgt waren Sie, der Besitzer des echten Gemäldes zu sein und das Geld wieder zu verlieren?") Worry was neither defined, specified, nor associated with the elements of risk: magnitude of loss or likelihood of loss. Rather we kept the question more general so as to elicit the emotional state of the respondent when the person faced a given scenario. Subjects answered using a 10-point rating scale with 1 = not worried at all to 10 = very worried.
Towards the end of the experiment, individuals were also asked to fill out the 25-item worry domains questionnaire (WDQ) by Tallis, Eysenck, and Mathews (1992) , which measures a general tendency to worry.
RESULTS

General considerations
The distributions of subjective probability as well as of WTP are highly skewed. Hence, our descriptive analysis for these variables is based on medians instead of means. For the sake of simplicity, our analyses focus on the joint probability of both fire and theft as well as WTP for insurance against both hazards. We computed the probability of a loss from either fire or theft to be approximately 1/5000 for groups 1 and 2 and one in five for group 3 (the exact number is 0.19, in the latter case).
With two measurements of WTP from each of the 254 respondents, we generated 508 observations of the dependent variable. Group 3A was omitted from the analysis for methodological reasons (see the Method section), reducing the number of observations to 422. An additional 17 observations were excluded because participants bid more for insurance than 10 000 times the expected loss (based on their subjective probabilities).
Willingness to pay and subjective probabilities in the different experimental treatments For events with very small probabilities of losses, individuals in groups 1 and 2 are willing to pay much more when the probability is ambiguous than when it is precise as shown in Table 2 . This finding conforms with other empirical data indicating aversion to ambiguity (see, e.g., Curley, Yates, & Abrams, 1986; Hogarth & Kunreuther, 1985) . The very high WTP of many individuals in our experiment is consistent with findings by Laury, McInnes, and Swarthout (2009) where subjects in a controlled laboratory experiment were willing to buy insurance policies that cost large multiples of the expected loss. Table 3 reveals that when the probabilities of a fire or theft are exact but very small, slightly more than one-third of the individuals will not pay anything for insurance when faced with either a separate or aggregated risk. Similar findings, albeit far less extreme, have been reported by McClelland et al. (1993) for an exact loss probability of 1%. The percentage of individuals who specify WTP = 0 for insurance is much lower when the risk is ambiguous for either separate risks (13%) or aggregated risks (20%).
As shown in Table 4 , when the risk of a loss is ambiguous, individuals greatly overestimate the likelihood of a fire or theft when the probabilities are very small (i.e., one in 5000) and slightly underestimate these likelihoods when the risk is relatively high (one in five). Whereas the difference between these two subjective probability judgments is statistically significant for individuals with WTP > 0 (Table 4) , increasing the ambiguous loss probability by a factor of 1000 has no significant effect on either WTP or the percentage of those not willing to pay anything for insurance (Tables 2 and 3 ).
Comparing relative impact of worry and subjective probability using elasticities To examine the relative importance of worry and probabilities on WTP, one can undertake a statistical regression analysis where WTP is the dependent variable and worry and subjective probability are the two independent variables. Because of the number of individuals who indicated WTP = 0, we ran a Tobit regression (Tobin, 1958; Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 517-529) , the standard econometric technique for dealing with censored response variables such as WTP ≥ 0. A censored variable, such as WTP, is a dependent variable where some values, in this case WTP < 0, are impossible but might have been predicted from the values of the independent variables. To compare the effects of subjective probabilities and worry on WTP, we report on the elasticities, a measure frequently used by economists so that the independent variables are all on the same scale. Elasticity is defined as the ratio of the percent change in one variable to the percent change in another variable. Formally, elasticity (E) is defined as follows:
Our specific interest is in comparing the elasticities of the independent variables subjective probability and worry with WTP as the dependent variable. In Table 5 , subjective probabilities have a statistically significant impact on WTP, but the elasticity is only 0.19. In other words, WTP increases by only 19% when probability judgments increase by 100%. For a given loss (as in our experiment), both expected utility or expected value models would imply that WTP should increase by the same percentage as the probability increases-100% in this case rather than 19%.
The finding that probability judgments do not appear to explain the premiums that individuals are willing to pay for insurance is underlined by the Kruskal-Wallis test that indicates a non-significant difference between groups 1A and 3B (Table 2 ). This finding is actually replicated in the Tobit regression results detailed in Table 5 where the dummycoded "high-risk treatment" variable takes on the value 0 for group 1A (low risk) and 1 for group 3B (high risk). Increasing the likelihood of loss by a factor of 1000 does not affect WTP directly because the elasticity of the high-risk treatment dummy turns out to be non-significant.
The Tobit regression results reported in Table 5 also indicate that the elasticity of the worry variable with respect to WTP is highly statistically significant. Its elasticity value of 0.9 implies that when a person's worry score doubles, her WTP for insurance almost doubles. For an illustration of the significant effect of worry on the premiums that individuals are willing to pay for insurance, Table 6 reports on median values of WTP for individuals having worry scores between 1 and 5 versus individuals having worry scores between 6 and 10. Those individuals with high worry scoreshave a WTP that is 2.4 times larger than those with a low worry score.
Ruling out alternative explanations of the impact of worry There are two principal reasons why the relationship between worry and WTP might be a spurious one. We examine them in the following and show why they can be ruled out on the basis of the analysis of the data from the experiments.
Explanation 1: the level of worry is a proxy for subjective probability To determine whether this is the case, we compute the correlation between subjective probability judgment and worry for high and low risks when the likelihood of a fire and theft are ambiguous. The data in Table 7 show that the Pearson correlation coefficients were low and non-significant for those who indicated they would not pay anything for insurance and those whose WTP > 0 as well as for both cases combined. These data indicate that worry and subjective probability are independent variables.
Explanation 2: individuals justify their willingness to pay by their worry ratings Even though there were a large number of intervening questions between elicitation of WTP, the probability table, and the worry question, we tested whether the effect of worry could also be due to ex post justification. In other words, did those individuals with a large WTP specify high levels of worry to justify their choices? Note that this would be an explanation contrary to what we suggested above: instead of worry driving WTP, this explanation would argue that WTP drives self-reports of worry. Using an instrumental variables regression, we found no evidence of this type of reverse causality. This procedure is explained in detail in Appendix C.
A check of robustness: role of worry for willingness to pay with exact versus ambiguous probabilities
As a robustness check of our results, we also examined the Spearman rank correlations between worry and WTP in groups 1 and 2 separately for the case where probabilities are ambiguous (part A) and the case where probabilities are known (part B). In both cases, the correlation coefficient is almost identical (0.31 and 0.35, respectively) and highly significant (p = 0.0001 and p < 0.0001, respectively). Furthermore, including an interaction term between worry and ambiguity in the Tobit regression of Table 5 for groups 1 and 2 yields an insignificant coefficient for the interaction term (p = 0.74).
DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
We are now able to provide answers to the three questions raised in the Introduction section:
(1) When the probability of a loss is ambiguous, fewer individuals specify WTP = 0 than with exact probabilities. Those who are willing to purchase coverage pay considerably more for insurance when the probability is ambiguous than when it is exact. Both differences are large and statistically significant. (2) The relative importance of worry is much larger than that of subjective probability for WTP for insurance when the probability of a disaster is small as indicated by a comparison of the two relevant elasticities. (3) The comparison of WTP in situations differing by a factor of 1000 in loss probabilities leads to a non-significant effect on WTP.
With exact probabilities, WTP is also far larger than the expected loss, implying that individuals would have to be extremely risk averse if they were expected utility maximizers. When probabilities are ambiguous, individuals are even less likely to comply with the expected utility model for the following reasons:
(a) Subjective probabilities have only a very small impact on WTP (see the above answer to question #2), (b) Increasing the probability by a factor of 1000 does not have a statistically significant effect on WTP (see the above answer to question #3), and (c) Other studies indicate that most individuals do not use probabilities in their decision-making process unless they are presented with this information before being asked to make a choice (Hogarth & Kunreuther, 1995; Huber, Wider, & Huber, 1997) .
Our experimental findings have important implications for future research. If worry is so important in determining the premiums individuals are willing to pay for insurance against low-probability events, it would be helpful to know what factors actually account for worry. We were able to identify one, albeit weak, factor from our own experimental data. Because we had measured individuals' general worry tendencies using the WDQ, we could calculate the correlation between self-reports of worry in our experimental situation and general worry tendencies. The correlation turned out to be small but significant (0.19; p < 0.01, N = 237). Other "candidates" determining the level of worry in a decision situation that might be analyzed in future research are the vividness of potential negative events through TV clips, the behavior of politicians, and/ or personal experience.
Insurance agents also reveal in personal conversations we have had with them that the most effective way to sell insurance is to make people think of how they would feel if something had happened to them. And they hardly ever voluntarily provide estimates of the probability of a negative event to their prospective clients and are unlikely to be asked for this information by their customers. Instead, they often show films of factory buildings in flames when they want to sell industry fire insurance, for example. Given our findings, however, this might also be an interesting case for consumer protection organizations to pursue because insurers might take undue advantage of how individuals respond to graphic information.
Using random outcomes with large stakes appears to have helped generate our findings because it might have led individuals to take the experimental situation more seriously and should be considered in future experiments on decision making with respect to low-probability, high-consequence events. It would be useful to supplement these controlled laboratory experiments with field research so as to gain insight into the external validity of the findings reported in this experiment. Protecting Against Low-Probability Disasters 539 C. Schade et al. 
